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ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENT TAFT ON ARBITRATION.

REMARKS OF PRESIDENT TAFT AT A BANQUET GIVEN IN HIS HONOR BY THE AMERICAN PEACE AND ARBITRATION LEAGUE IN THE BALLROOM OF THE HOTEL ASTOR, NEW YORK CITY, MARCH 22, 1910.

Mr. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: In the first place, I should like to thank the American Peace and Arbitration League for the compliment of this beautiful banquet. I claim to be an expert in banquets. Therefore, when I say that this is a beautiful banquet and one of the finest that I have ever attended, I hope it may convey the superlative.

In the next place, I should like to say that the significance of this meeting is not in the fact that the President of the United States is here seeking peace by arbitration, but it is that such a doctrine has been advocated by a Kentuckian, former Senator McCreary.

I am glad to see about me here ambassadors of powerful countries and ministers representing the strength of Europe and of this hemisphere—all in favor of peace by arbitration. The truth is that the subject does not offer much opportunity for variety. We are all in favor of virtue; we are all in favor of goodness, and we are all in favor of peace; and as peace can be best maintained by arbitration and conciliation, of course we are in favor of it, even if we come from Kentucky—in favor of resorting to arbitration rather than to war. I say we all are, but I know there are some gentlemen who, in order to be unlike most others, favor war as a necessary treatment of a nation in order to develop its finest qualities, and I am not disposed to say that, as we look back in history, some of the most dreadful wars in history, notably that of our Civil War, could hardly have been avoided if we were to accomplish the good which that war did accomplish. But as a general thing we are all opposed to war, because war is hell. And when you have said

that, and said that any means of avoiding it by arbitration or conciliation is to be sought, it seems to me that it is difficult to arouse a controversy on the subject. But my friend from Kentucky and I stand together in this—that because we are in favor of universal peace, and in favor of arbitration in order to secure it, that does not mean that we are in favor of one country giving up that which we now use for the purpose of securing peace, to wit, our Army and our Navy.

I don't want to seem inconsistent in speaking so emphatically in favor of peace by arbitration, and in using every effort that I can bring to bear on Congress to have two more battleships this year. I am hopeful that we may continue with that until the Panama Canal is constructed, so that then our naval force shall be doubled by reason of the connection between the two coasts; and then we can stop and think whether we wish to go further. Perhaps by that time there shall be adopted by general agreement a means of reducing armament. Certainly, whenever it comes, we will not be, I am sure, the power to interfere with that general movement.

I am quite sure that the distinguished chairman has only yielded to that kindly feeling that he always has toward me except in a presidential election, in attributing to me the honor of being the first President or the first Chief Executive to speak at a public meeting in favor of arbitration. I know, or I feel confident, that there are many executive heads who have done the same thing, and who have longed for peace. The expense of armament is working toward peace. The expense of war, I am sorry to say, is having greater weight in securing peace than the expense of lives. A nation does not lightly enter upon war now for two reasons: First, because the expense is so great that it is likely to lead to bankruptcy even if she wins; and, second, if she does not win the government or dynasty or whatever it may be that is in control of the government is likely to go down under the humiliation of that defeat at the hands of her own people. Those two things are working in a healthful way toward ultimate peace.

Now, if we have a permanent court of arbitration—one to which we can easily refer all questions—the opportunity is likely to be seized upon—certainly to be seized upon by that

country that is in the contest to follow, if war is to follow, not quite prepared; and so, by its demanding or proposing a reference to the court, it will put the other country in the attitude of desiring war—an attitude that I think no country would like under present conditions to occupy before the world. As a resort to this permanent court becomes more and more frequent, questions which can be submitted in the view of the nations will grow broader and broader in their scope.

I have noticed exceptions in our arbitration treaties, as to reference of questions of honor—of national honor—to courts of arbitration. Personally, I don't see any more reason why matters of national honor should not be referred to a court of arbitration any more than matters of property or matters of national proprietorship.

I know that is going further than most men are willing to go, but as among men we have to submit differences even if they involve honor, now, if we obey the law, to the court, or let them go undecided. It is true that our courts can enforce the law, and as between nations there is no court with a sheriff or a marshal that can enforce the law. But I do not see why questions of honor may not be submitted to a tribunal, supposed to be composed of men of honor who understand questions of national honor, to abide by their decision, as well as any other question of difference arising between nations.

I do not know that I can quite agree with my friend, the "Kentucky peacemaker" as to the Monroe doctrine. I agree with the Monroe doctrine, but I think it has come pretty near to getting us into trouble a number of times. But we got over it without war, and still I think that was only because the Lord looks after children, drunken men, and the United States.

Now, there is one question that I think is within the actual control of Congress, action upon which will promote the power of the Executive in preventing questions of embarrassment and difficulty between this country and other countries with whom we would be at peace. I am not sure how this will strike the Kentuck mind, because when we reach the Constitution and the division of power between the States and the United States, unless it involves an appropriation to the general welfare in the neighborhood of Kentucky, we on different sides of the

Ohio River—because the Senator and I look at each other across the river—have different views.

But I believe that the Senator, with his profound knowledge of constitutional law, will nevertheless agree with me that it is within the power of Congress to put in the hands of the Executive and in the courts of the United States the power on the one hand to prosecute and on the other hand to hear crimes denounced by Federal law, which consist in a violation of the rights of aliens secured by treaties made by the United States with other countries. With all the solemnity that goes with the making of our treaties—signed by the President, confirmed by the Senate—we say to the people of other countries who come to this land: “ You shall be protected in certain rights; you shall enjoy them under the protection of the United States.” And then they come over here with that hope, with that security, and a conspiracy is entered upon by some of our people to deprive them of these rights, and crimes are committed against them, and their representative at Washington comes to the State Department and says: “ Here are our citizens and our subjects who have come here under the protection of the treaty which you made, saying that they should enjoy all these rights, and they have been deprived by violence of these rights. Now we ask you to fulfill that promise to prosecute the men who have been engaged in this violation of the rights of the people we represent, as you promised to do.”

And we say: “ Well, we are very sorry. It is true we entered into that promise, and we intended to have it kept, and therefore we will write a note to the governor of the State and express the hope that his district attorneys will institute prosecutions before the grand juries of the State and see that justice is done.”

When it usually occurs through prejudice existing in that very community where you expect to have justice done. Now I say that puts us in a pusillanimous position. I say that we have no business to enter into any international promise that we can not use the right arm of the Federal Government to maintain and keep.

I dwelt upon this subject in my inaugural address, and I hope to press it again upon the attention of Congress; but I thought,

in view of the fact that we are all agreed about arbitration and peace and the abolishment of war, if we can bring it about, that I would suggest one practical means by which you can clothe your Executive with a means of avoiding difficulty with foreign countries and with a means of avoiding putting your Chief Executive and yourselves in a humiliating position with reference to your pledged promise.

And now, ladies and gentlemen, I have done. I did not expect to talk quite so long. I have been talking all the week, clear from Chicago here, and if what I have said seems to lack preparation, you may understand that you can not prepare every speech, however dignified and however attractive the audience.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT AT THE BANQUET OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY FOR THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES,
AT THE NEW WILLARD, WASHINGTON, D. C., DECEMBER 17, 1910.

We hear a great deal nowadays of movements and societies and legislative resolutions in favor of international peace, and I assume that no one would wish to be put in the position of denying that peace contributes greatly to the happiness of mankind, or of advocating war as an institution to be fostered in and of itself. To say that one is in favor of peace is not much more startling than to say that one is in favor of honesty, in favor of virtue, in favor of good, and opposed to evil. That from which the world can derive the most benefit is a practical suggestion leading to more permanent peace. Many have thought that this could be brought about by an agreement among the powers to disarm, and some sort of a convention by which the race to bankruptcy in the maintenance of great armies and the construction of great navies might cease and a gradual disarmament follow. Future events may justify some different conclusion, but movements in the past along this line have not been fruitful of practical results. Bankruptcy and the burdensome weight of debt involved in continued armament may bring about a change in the present national tendencies. Meantime, however, I am strongly convinced that the best method of ultimately securing disarmament is the establishment of an international court and the development of a code of international equity which nations will recognize as affording a better method of settling international controversies than war. We must have some method of settling issues between nations, and if we do not have arbitration, we shall have war. Of course the awful results of war with its modern armaments and frightful cost of life and treasure, and its inevitable shaking of dynasties and governments, have made nations more chary of resort to the sword than ever before; and the present, therefore, because of this, would seem to be an excellent time for pressing the substitution of courts for force.

I am glad to come here and to give my voice in favor of the establishment of a permanent international court. I sincerely hope that the negotiations which Secretary Knox has initiated in favor of an international prize court—after the establishment of that court—will involve the enlargement of that court into a general arbitral court for international matters. It is quite likely that the provisions for the constitution of the arbitral court will have to be different somewhat from those that govern the selection of members of the prize court, but I am glad to think that the two movements are in the same direction and are both likely to be successful.

What teaches nations and peoples the possibility of permanent peace is the actual settlement of controversies by courts of arbitration. The settlement of the Alabama controversy by the Geneva arbitration, the settlement of the seals controversy by the Paris Tribunal, the settlement of the Newfoundland fisheries controversy by The Hague Tribunal are three great substantial steps toward permanent peace, three facts accomplished that have done more for the cause than anything else in history.

If now we can negotiate and put through a positive agreement with some great nation to abide the adjudication of an international arbitral court in every issue which can not be settled by negotiation, no matter what it involves, whether honor, territory, or money, we shall have made a long step forward by demonstrating that it is possible for two nations at least to establish as between them the same system of due process of law that exists between individuals under a government.

It seems to be the view of many that it is inconsistent for those of us who advocate any kind of preparation for war or any maintenance of armed force or fortification to raise our voices for peaceful means of settling international controversies. But I think this view is quite unjust and is not practical. We only recognize existing conditions and know that we have not reached a point where war is impossible or out of the question, and do not believe that the point has been reached in which all nations are so constituted that they may not at times violate their national obligations.

Take, thus, the question of the Panama Canal. We have a property which when completed will be worth \$400,000,000—

at least, it will have cost us that. It has been built not alone to further the cause of the world's commerce, but also to bring our eastern and western seabards closer together and to secure us the military benefit enabling our naval fleet to pass quickly from one ocean to the other. Now, the works of the canal are of such a character that a war vessel might easily put the canal out of commission. We are authorized to police the canal and protect it, and we have the treaty right to erect fortifications there. Fortifications are the best and most secure method of protecting that canal against the attack of some irresponsible nation or armed force. It is said that we could neutralize the canal and by inducing all nations to agree not to attack the canal secure its immunity from injury. But the trouble is that nations are quite as likely as men to violate their obligations under great stress like that of war. It seems to me that we ought to put ourselves in a position with reference to this very valuable and delicate piece of property so that, should any nation forget its obligation, we will be in a position to prevent unlawful injury to this instrument of commerce so valuable to the world and so indispensable to us. The fact that we fortify the canal will not prevent us from discharging all international obligations that we may have in respect to it, but it will enable us to defend ourselves in its possession against the act of every irresponsible force or nation. It will not prevent our maintaining its neutrality if that is wise and right.

I would like to invite attention to an interesting incident within the last month. Suppose a *Dreadnought* under the command of the men who have recently been in command of *Dreadnoughts* were to seek entrance to that canal by force. What we need is something to defend what is ours, and because we have the means of defending it is no reason why we should not neutralize the canal completely if that be wise.

Again, our strong feeling in favor of peace, it seem to me, ought not to prevent our taking the proper steps under existing conditions to maintain our national defenses. We have on the continent of the United States excellent coast defenses for every important harbor that an enemy could enter. We probably ought to see to it that we have ammunition and guns enough

for ready use in case of emergency. We have a small but very efficient Army of 80,000 men. We have a militia of about 125,000 men. The Army is so constituted that we could enlarge it from a skeleton organization into a much larger body. We ought to have more trained officers, so as to furnish the teachers to a larger body of men that war might require us to enlist.

There has been a good deal of talk in the papers, and some reference in Congress, to the supposed helpless condition of this country in the event of a foreign invasion. I venture to think that much more has been made of this than the facts, calmly considered, would justify. We have a very good Navy, and with the opening of the Panama Canal it will be a much more effective one. It would be useful to prevent the coming of an invading army across the seas.

The people of this country will never consent to the maintenance of a standing army which military experts would pronounce sufficiently large to cope in battle with the standing armies of Europe, should they get by our Navy, avoid our harbor defenses, and descend upon our coast. If this leaves us in a position of helplessness, then so be it. For those who understand the popular will in this country know that it can not be otherwise. We shall do everything in the way of wise military preparation if we maintain our present Regular Army, if we continue to improve the national militia, if we pass the pending volunteer bill, to go into operation when war is declared and not to involve the Nation in a dollar's worth of expense until the emergency arises; if we pass a law, now pending in Congress, which will give us a force of additional officers trained in the military art, and able in times of peace to render efficient service in drilling the militia of the States, and in filling useful quasi-civil positions that are of the utmost advantage to the Government, and if we in a reasonable time accumulate guns and ammunition enough to equip and arm the force we could enlist under our colors in an emergency.

This discussion of needed military preparations does not sound very well at a peace meeting, but the trouble about a peace meeting is that it seems to me to be just one-half of the picture, and I want to introduce the whole picture in order

that what is resolved here and what is said here may be understood to be said with a view to existing conditions and to the practical truth.

I have said this much in order to allay the so-called war scare which has furnished pabulum for the newspapers during the last few days. There is not the slightest reason for such a sensation. We are at peace with all the nations of the world, and are quite likely to remain so as far as we can see into the future. Just a little more forethought, a little more attention to the matter on the part of Congress, and we shall have all of the Army and all of the munitions and material of war that we ought to have in a Republic situated, as we are, 3,000 miles on the one hand and 5,000 miles on the other from the source of possible invasion. Our Army is much more expensive per man than that of any other nation, and it is not an unmixed evil that it is so, because it necessarily restricts us to the maintenance of a force which is indispensable in the ordinary policing of this country and our dependencies and furnishes an additional reason for our using every endeavor to maintain peace.

I congratulate this association on the recent foundation of Mr. Carnegie, by which, under the wise guidance of Mr. Elihu Root, Mr. Knox, and their associates, an income of half a million of dollars annually is to be expended in the practical promotion of movements to secure permanent peace. The wide discretion given to the trustees, and their known ability, foresight, and common sense insure the usefulness of the gift.

War has not disappeared and history will not be free from it for years to come, but the worst pessimist can not be blind to the fact that in the last 25 years long steps have been taken in the direction of the peaceful settlement of international controversies, and the establishment of a general arbitral court for all nations is no longer the figment of the brain of a dreamy enthusiast.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT AT THE DINNER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY, HOTEL ASTOR, NEW YORK CITY, JANUARY 21, 1911.

GENTLEMEN OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY: I am glad to be here and am glad to know that so much of the energy, the enterprise, and the intelligence of New York has been contributed by the sons of William Penn. William Penn was in favor of peace. So, too, are the men of Pennsylvania. But I assume that they are practical men who do not lose sight of facts and existing conditions in an ecstasy of hope and Utopian enthusiasm.

I am going to invite your attention to the question now pending in Congress as to whether the Panama Canal ought to be fortified. I can not think that any careful person will read the record of historical facts, treaties, and acts of Congress, and diplomatic negotiations without conceding the full right of the United States to fortify the canal. But memories are short, records are not always at hand, and without in the slightest degree conceding that the existence of the full right of the United States to fortify her own property on the Isthmus is in the slightest doubt, I venture, before considering the question of the policy of fortifying the canal, to refer to the history which makes the right incontestible.

In 1850 we made the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England, which contemplated a canal built by somebody other than the contracting parties and probably by private enterprise across Central America or the Isthmus of Panama. By that treaty we agreed with England that we would neither of us own any part of the land in which the canal was to be built, and we would neither of us fortify it, and we would unite together in guaranteeing its neutrality and would invite the rest of the nations to become parties to the agreement. The canal was not built under that treaty. The French attempted it and failed. We had a Spanish war. The cruise of the *Oregon* of 12,000 miles along the seacoast of two continents, from San Francisco to Cuba, at a time when the seat of war was in the

West Indies fastened the attention of the American people upon the absolute necessity for a canal as a military instrument for doubling the efficiency of our Navy and for preventing a division of our forces of defense which might in the future subject us to humiliating defeat. This lesson brought about the effort to modify the Clayton-Bulwer treaty for the very purpose of securing the right on the part of the United States to own the land through which the canal was to be built, to construct the canal itself, and to regain the power to fortify the canal which it had parted with in the treaty of 1850 under other conditions. The correspondence between Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Hay, as well as Mr. Hay's statement to the Senate in transmitting the treaty which was finally ratified, show beyond peradventure that it was recognized by both parties to that treaty, first, that the canal to be built should be one to be built by the United States, to be owned by the United States, to be managed by the United States, and that the neutrality of the canal which was to be maintained, was to be maintained by the United States; second, that nothing in the treaty would prevent the United States from fortifying the canal, and that in case of war between the United States and England or any other country nothing in the treaty would prevent the United States from closing the canal to the shipping of an enemy. In the absence of treaty restriction, of course, these rights inhere in the sovereignty of the United States and the control of its own. It is perfectly palpable that this was insisted upon by the Senate, for the reason that one of the main motives in the construction of the canal was the extension of the coast line of the United States through the canal and the use of the canal in time of war as an instrument of defense. The guaranty of neutrality in the treaty is subject, and necessarily subject, to this construction.

The purpose and assertion of the right of the people of the United States to fortify the canal are shown again in the passage of the Spooner Act in 1902 directing the President to build the canal and to make proper defenses. The treaty with Panama reaffirms the treaty with England, made in 1900, and expressly gives to the United States the power of fortification. How, then, can anyone dispute the right of the United States to

fortify the canal, when the English treaty was amended for the very purpose of regaining it, when it is expressly given in the treaty made with Panama that granted us the land on which to build the canal, and when not a single foreign nation—including in this England, who has made a treaty with us on the subject—has ever seen fit to suggest a lack of power to do that which an act of Congress nine years old directed the President to do, and on the faith of which \$500,000,000 are being expended?

The right of the United States to fortify the canal and to close it against the use of an enemy in time of war being established, what should be its policy? We built the canal to help us defend the country; not to help an enemy to attack it. Even if a certain and practical neutralization of the canal by agreement of all nations could be secured to us when engaged in war, an enemy could then use the canal for transit to attack us in both oceans as we propose to use it to defend ourselves. After expending \$500,000,000 thus to make our national defense easier, are we to surrender half the military value of the canal by giving the benefit of it to a nation seeking to destroy us? It seems to me that the very statement of the proposition carries its refutation.

But it is said that we ought to defend the canal by our Navy. I am not a strategist; I am not a military or a naval expert; but it seems to me as plain as that one and one are two that a navy is for the purpose of defense through offense, for the purpose of protection by attack, and that if we have to retain a part of our Navy in order to defend the canal on both sides, then the canal becomes a burden and not an instrument of defense at all. The canal ought to defend itself, and we ought to have fortifications there which will be powerful enough to keep off the navies of any nation that might possibly attack us. I am glad to see that Capt. Mahan, one of the greatest naval strategists, in a communication to this morning's Tribune, confirms this view.

Again, under our treaty with England and other countries, it is we who guarantee the neutrality of the canal. It is not the other countries that guarantee it to us, and we are bound, if we conform to the treaty with England, to put ourselves in such a condition that we can perform that guaranty. Suppose Eng-

land is at war with some other country that is not bound to us by treaty rights at all; is not it essential that we should have fortifications there to protect the canal, not only for our own use and for the world's commerce, but for the use of England and her warships as a means of passage? In other words, we have to preserve that canal as a means of transit to belligerents in time of war as long as we are ourselves not engaged in the controversy.

But it is said that we could induce all the powers to come in and consent to the neutrality of the canal as a treaty obligation. I should be glad to do this if possible; but even if we do this, can we feel entirely safe by reason of that agreement from a possible injury to the canal by some irresponsible belligerent, at least under conditions as they now are?

Then it is said that the fortifications are going to cost \$50,000,000. This is an error. The estimated cost of the fortifications for the canal is \$12,000,000. That, I submit, constitutes hardly more than 2 per cent of the cost of the canal—a first premium for insuring its safety that is not excessive.

It is also said that it will cost \$5,000,000 a year to maintain them. This is also an error. I have consulted the War Department, and they advise me that the addition to the annual Government cost of maintenance of fortifications and military establishment in time of peace due to the fortifications of the canal would not exceed half a million dollars—an annual insurance rate after first cost of a tenth of 1 per cent.

The case of the Suez Canal furnishes no analogy whatever. In the first place, the Suez Canal is nothing but a ditch in a desert, incapable of destruction, and even when obstructed it can be cleared within a very short time. The Panama Canal, by the destruction of the gate locks, could be put out of commission for two years, and the whole commerce of the world made to suffer therefrom.

Again, the land through which the Suez Canal runs is not in the jurisdiction of England or of any one of the five great powers. Many nations partake in the ownership of the canal, and it is not within the control of any single nation. The circumstances under which the Panama Canal has been building, the ownership of the strip, and one of the main purposes for

which it was constructed are very different and make it exactly as if it were a canal cut through the narrow part of Florida. It is on American soil and under American control, and it needs our fortifications for national defense just as much as the city of New York needs fortifications, and there is the additional reason that we ought to have them in order to perform our international obligations.

I yield to no one in my love of peace, in my hatred of war, and in my earnest desire to avoid war. I believe that we have made great strides toward peace within the last decade. No one that I know of goes further in favor of settling international controversies by arbitration than I do, and if I have my way and am able to secure the assent of other powers, I shall submit to the Senate arbitration treaties broader in their terms than any that body has heretofore ratified, and broader than any that now exist between the nations. In laying down my office, I could leave no greater claim to the gratitude of my countrymen than to have secured such treaties. But I can not permit myself in the enthusiastic desire to secure universal peace to blind myself to the possibilities of war. We have not reached the time when we can count on the settlement of all international controversies by the arbitrament of a tribunal.

I welcome most highly the rapidly increasing ranks of the advocates of peace. They help to form a public opinion of the world that is, with appreciable progress, forcing nations to a settlement of quarrels by negotiation or peace tribunal. When adjudication by arbitral court shall be accepted, the motive for armament will disappear. But we can not hope to bring about such a condition for decades. Meantime, we must face the facts and see conditions as they are. Some earnest advocates of peace weaken their advocacy by failing to do this. War is still a possibility; and a President, a Senator, a Congressman who ignores it, as something against which proper precautions should be taken, subjects himself in time of peace to the just criticism of all reasonable men, and when war comes and finds the nation unprepared, to the unanimous condemnation of his indignant fellow-countrymen.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT BEFORE THE THIRD NATIONAL PEACE CONGRESS AT THE LYRIC THEATER, BALTIMORE, MD., MAY 3, 1911.

MR. CHAIRMAN, AND LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It expresses my feelings when I say that I am frightened by the introduction of the chairman. I have been told before that I exercise in the presidential office greater power than any man on earth, and I have been able to take that idea in and know how much of it is real fact and how much of it is eloquence turning a good period. It is possible that the President does exercise greater power than that of any other ruler in the world, but I am able to give you a little information from the standpoint of one with some opportunity to observe, and I am bound to say that the burden and responsibility of the position are brought home to him much more clearly than the power.

Your chairman has been good enough to refer to what I have said with reference to general arbitration, and to my expressed opinion that an arbitration treaty of the widest scope between two great nations would be a very important step in securing the peace of the world. I don't claim any patent for a new discovery in that suggestion, because I have no doubt that it has often been made before and has long been shared by all who understand the situation at all. If such an arbitration treaty can be concluded I have no doubt that an important step will have been taken, but it will not bring an end of war. It is a step only, and we must not defeat our purposes by enlarging the expectation of the world as to what is to happen and by then disappointing it. We must realize that we are dealing with a world that is fallible and full of weakness, with somewhat of wickedness in it, and that reforms that are worth having are brought about little by little, and not by one blow. I don't mean to say by this that I am not greatly interested and enthusiastic in seeking to secure the arbitration treaty or treaties that are suggested, but I do think we are likely to make more progress if we express our hopes with moderation

and realize the difficulties that are to be overcome than if we proclaim that we have opened the gate to eternal peace with one key and within one year.

I am not going to dwell upon the question of the arbitration treaty which is in the process of negotiation. The truth is, I would much rather stand upon the platform and refer to such a step when taken, to such a treaty when made and acquiesced in, than to discuss it during its negotiation; and therefore I would wish to direct the few remarks I address to you this afternoon to other but kindred subjects.

I have recently received a great many invitations from various associations whose titles indicated that their purpose was the promotion of peace, and it has seemed to me that in their closer cooperation we might find some opportunity for an improvement in the movement and give greater force to the cause by organized expression. You have a congress here, and in this congress I assume that a good many associations take part. Have you any basis of organization and union which unites your efforts in anything but this congress? Don't you think you had better bind your peace associations together in a federation and make your efforts united toward the one object you have in view? Aren't you likely to squander a little of your force if you maintain isolated associations without union?

My second suggestion is that one of the evidences of an improvement in the world for peace is the fact that all state departments, all foreign chancelleries, are themselves now organized into agencies for the promotion of peace by negotiation. The State Department at Washington has no more important or absorbing duty than to lend its good offices to the 20 Republics of this hemisphere to prevent their various differences from leading into war. And not to go back of this administration, there have been four instances in which the action of our State Department, taken in connection with some of the influential countries of South America, has absolutely prevented war, which 20 or 30 years ago would certainly have ensued.

The recurrence of war is not now so frequent between stable and powerful governments maintaining law and order within their respective borders as it is in those governments which do

not exercise complete control over their people, and in which revolutions and insurrections break out, not only to the injury and danger of the peoples and their property and of the government itself, but to the disturbance of all the world in their neighborhood. It is with reference to disturbances of this kind that the United States and the other great Republics of this hemisphere must exercise their kindly and peaceful influence as much as possible.

One of the difficulties that the United States finds is the natural suspicion that the countries engaged have of the motive which the United States has in tendering its good offices. Asservation of good faith helps but little where the suspicion is real, and yet I like to avail myself of an opportunity in such a presence as this, to assert that there is not in the whole length and breadth of the United States, among its people, any desire for territorial aggrandizement, and that its people as a whole will not permit its Government, if it would, to take any steps in respect to foreign peoples, looking to a forcible extension of our political power.

We have had wars, and we know what they are. We know what responsibilities they entail, the burdens and losses and horrors, and we would have none of them. We have a magnificent domain of our own in which we are attempting to work out and show to the world success in popular government, and we need no more territory in which to show that. But we have attained great prosperity and great power. We have become a powerful member of the community of nations in which we live, and there is therefore thrust upon us necessarily a care and responsibility for the peace of the world in our neighborhood and a burden of helping those nations that can not help themselves, if we may do that peacefully and effectively.

Now, we have undertaken such a duty in respect to Santo Domingo. She was torn with contending factions. Foreign governments held her bonds and desired to collect what was due. We entered into an arrangement by which we put in our revenue officers to collect the revenues. We took charge of the customhouse, and that mere agency gave us an instrumentality by which we have enabled that nation to go on, until she is rapidly paying off her debts and becoming powerful and

prosperous. While our revenue collectors have been there she has had no faction or revolution. I may add that our position with respect to Santo Domingo enabled us to intervene when she and Haiti thought it was necessary to fight about something and to induce those two nations to submit their differences to The Hague.

And now, my friends, I shall not continue these desultory remarks. I only want to say that I am glad to come here to this world's congress of peace, and, in so far as I have any representative character, by my presence here, to lend to it the support and approval of the people of the United States.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT AT ARLINGTON CEMETERY, ON MEMORIAL
DAY, MAY 30, 1911.

As we gather in this assembly, with all the thoughts that its surroundings suggest, the question presents itself, "What is the purpose of these commemorative services?" It is said that we are here to pay tribute to our patriotic dead—to those who yielded up their lives that our country might be saved. But does our coming here and do our ceremonies and hymns and eloquent tributes make the dead happier? If from somewhere their souls contemplate this scene, are they gratified merely because we praise them? Is it not rather that they can see that the influence of their deeds lives after them in the uplifting and revitalizing of the highest ideals of the living? These ceremonies are not for the benefit of the dead. They are to keep green the memory of their deeds and thereby to stir in the living members of society—in the citizens of to-day—the spirit of high appreciation and enthusiastic emulation of those supreme sacrifices for their fellow-countrymen that the sight of these graves of the dead makes alive to us.

Love of country, love of family, love of God—it is difficult to classify these affections of the human heart and soul, for they so melt into each other that the one who has most of one has most of all.

As we stand, however, in the presence of the dead on this beautiful May morning and seek to realize and enjoy the essence of patriotism which, like incense, steals into the atmosphere of this sacred spot, we find ourselves slipping into a conception of war as necessary to human development, the making of human character, and the exhibition of the highest human ideals. We lost sight of the cruelty, the courage, the arousing of the most brutal human passion, the indifference to human suffering, the meanest human ambitions, the ghoulish corruption, and all the other wickedness that follows in the trail of war, and we think only of the calm spirit of supreme

self-sacrifice that ennobled the brave soldier who lost his life in the shock of battle and who rests peacefully with his comrades in these beautiful shades.

Of course, it is necessary that we should have sin and temptation if we would have exhibitions of virtue which resist them; but is that a reason for favoring either temptation or sin? Of course, in order that we should know the existence and power of the highest traits of the human soul, we must have human tragedies, but certainly no one would promote a tragedy for the purpose of furnishing to the world proof of the existence of such traits. Strive as we may to prevent or destroy them, we shall have sin and wickedness and temptation and tragedy enough as a school of experience, development, and demonstration of human character. The same answer must be made to those who permit themselves to advocate war as a necessary experience in the development of man.

There was a time when an insult by one man to another in the same social class could only be wiped out by the blood of the other in a mortal duel, and in those days it took more moral courage to avoid a duel than to fight one. We have made great progress, almost within our own memory, in such ideals. If that be true of men why may it not be true in the near future of nations? Why will it not show more patriotism and more love of country to refuse to go to war for an insult and to submit it to the arbitrament of a peaceful tribunal, than to subject a whole people to the misery and cruelty and suffering and burden of heavy cost of a national war, however glossed over by the excitement and ambitions and the glory of a successful conquest?

The lesson in national restraint, the looking at things as they are, the rejecting of the dictates of false pride, and the following of the teachings of the Master of men are not at all inconsistent with, and do not detract from, the continuance of the highest love of country and of one's countrymen.

Far be it from me to minimize in any way by these suggestions the debt we owe to the men buried here who carried on the successful struggle that resulted in the abolition of the cancer of slavery and which seemed ineradicable save by such

an awful slaughter of the brightest and bravest and best of the Nation's youth and manhood.

I shall not stop to discuss whether it might have been possible to accomplish the same great reform by milder methods. Whether that be true or not, the supreme sacrifice of these men, who lie about us, in the course of advancing humanity can never be lessened or obscured by such a suggestion. But the thought at which I would but hint this morning is that even in the hallowed presence of these dead, whose ideals of patriotism and love of their countrymen it needed a war to make everlastingly evident, we should abate no effort and should strain every nerve and avail ourselves of every honorable possible device to avoid war in the future.

I am not blind to the aid in creating sturdy manhood that the military discipline we see in the standing armies of Europe and in the Regular Army of this country furnishes, nor do I deny the incidental benefits that may grow out of the exigencies and sequelæ of war. But when the books are balanced the awful horrors of either internecine or international strife far outweigh the benefits that may be traced to it.

Let us leave this beautiful city of the national dead, therefore, with the deepest gratitude to the men whose valorous deeds we celebrate and whose memories we cherish with the tenderest appreciation of the value of the examples they set, but with a determination in every way possible, consistent with honesty and manly and national self-restraint, to avoid the necessity for the display of that supreme self-sacrifice that we commemorate to-day in them.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT AT THE MARION (IND.) BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL HOME FOR DISABLED VOLUNTEER SOLDIERS, JULY 2, 1911.

MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL VOLUNTEER SOLDIERS' HOME OF MARION: Such an audience as this, on the eve of the natal day of the Nation, stirs the depths of one's patriotic feeling. Harbors of refuge and havens of rest for those who in the stormy passages of their lives bared their breasts, in behalf of their country, to hostile bullets, serve two high purposes: In the first place, they contribute to the payment of their country's everlasting debt to its defenders; and, in the second place, they make known to all citizens the care which they may expect from a grateful Nation should they in a similar crisis offer their lives to save the Government. Better than monuments of brass to the dead are the comforts to the living in their old age, as an evidence of the country's love and veneration for patriotic self-sacrifice. Much more stimulating to the young is the contemplation of the Nation's heroes living in retirement, but in comfort, at its expense, and bringing back in their grizzled faces, in their armless sleeves, in their limbless bodies, the dangers they ran and the deeds they did. Of course such a presence can not but by reminiscence suggest the subject of war, for it was in the greatest war of modern times that the members of this home earned their right to be here. But war suggests its counterpart. It is those who have seen the horrors of war, who have felt its hardships, and have realized its cruelties, and seen the awful passions it could arouse, who have witnessed the suffering and brutality, as well as the courage and self-sacrifice, that knows its evils, and that feel most deeply the necessity for avoiding it when possible.

No man loved peace more than Grant and Sherman. Neither general hesitated, in time of war, to accomplish the national purpose, to sacrifice the lives that were necessary to achieve victory. No man had to bear any heavier charges of indifference to loss of life and suffering than they. Their greatness,

however, consisted in recognizing the necessity for action and in seeing clearly that if victories were to be won lives must be given up, and that any attempts to temporize with the occasion and mitigate the awful horrors would only lengthen the war and postpone the coming of peace, with all the suffering that such postponement necessarily entailed. No men were really more tender-hearted than they; and after the war none were more emphatic in their advocacy of peace and in their detestation of war. It is certain that Grant in his travels in Europe took less interest in the memorials of Napoleon, the greatest soldier of the world, than in a study of social conditions and a comparison of the peoples of the countries that he visited with those of his own. He had no patience with a military genius who sacrificed countries and peoples to his ambition, and whose whole history is nothing but a trail of bloody conquest following the lust of power and ultimate defeat, in all of which the people of France and of Europe were made to pay the cost and render the sacrifices.

I am far from saying that war has not in times past accomplished much in the progress of the world. Whether the same progress might have been achieved in a more peaceful way it is unnecessary to discuss. Probably not. It was by war that this country gained its independence of Great Britain. One hundred and thirty-five years ago the Declaration of Independence was signed, which changed a protest under arms against unjust government to a successful revolution. If England had been better advised, probably war would not have ensued, and we might now be, as in the case of Canada, cherishing attachment to the mother country without exercising complete independence. Certain it is that the lesson which we taught England she took to her heart, and in her colonial policy she continued to lighten the bonds which she had laid upon her colonies, until now they have no weight, and are merely nerves of affection from a mother to children, evincing an authority that, however great in form, is in fact, in the wisdom of the mother country, one of only nominal restriction. When, therefore, our forefathers signed that great instrument of independence, they were acting not only on behalf of the Thirteen Colonies of America, but they were building better than they

knew in that the result of their protest was to be a change of the entire colonial policy of Great Britain in the making of her English-speaking colonies that girdled the earth, self-governing and independent; and this result was achieved, not by war with the colonies, but by the persuasiveness of the error that she had made in dealing with us.

The War of 1812 might certainly have been avoided by arbitration. The questions there presented were questions all of which have been settled by the judgment of mankind in favor of our side of the controversy.

The War with Mexico—though there is some dispute over this—was one the questions of which were capable of solution by an impartial tribunal. Whether the Civil War could have been avoided is a very difficult question to answer. When slavery has become embedded in the social fiber of a country it is possible that only an excision of a war knife can remove the cancer.

Nor shall I attempt to answer a similar question as to the Spanish War. It is one of those instances of internal discussion like the Civil War; and yet I believe that the submission of the issues to a tribunal might have affected Spain's treatment of Cuba in such a way that we could have avoided a resort to arms. The truth is the danger of war between two great well-established countries with modern armaments is much less than that kind of war that arises from bad government or from the ambition of sinister men in a weak government, who overturn it. The awful consequences to two heavily armed countries under modern conditions of war have been a great deterrent of war; but the irresponsibility of men claiming to be patriots and desiring to overturn existing governments where law and order are not well established has led to a great deal of guerilla warfare and to the suffering of innocent people, who find no real principle involved in the two contending parties except that of ambition for power.

Much of this kind of work has occurred in South America and in Central America; and in that degree of guardianship which the United States must feel over the Republics of this hemisphere, in maintaining their integrity against European invasion, we ought to welcome every opportunity which gives

us a legitimate instrument by which we can make less probable such internecine strife. In the assertion of that sort of guardianship we have to be very careful to avoid the charge, which is always made by the suspicious, that we are seeking our own aggrandizement in our interference with the affairs of other countries of this hemisphere. It is an unfounded charge, for we envy no power its territory. We have enough. But we have been able to fend off war in five or more instances of recent date, because of our attitude as an elder brother of these smaller governments. Thus, in Cuba, after the Platt amendment, we were able to intervene and prevent a bloody war of revolution, and this after 20,000 rebels against the constituted Government were in arms immediately outside the city of Habana, ready to take part. We were able, by reason of the agreement we made with Santo Domingo, to help her collect her revenue and liquidate and satisfy her legitimate debts, by putting our agents in charge of the customhouses, to take away the chief motive for a rebellion and the chief hope of success of a revolution, which is the acquisition of the customhouse in order to collect taxes. And, by reason of our intervention between Haiti and Santo Domingo, we have been able to prevent a war between those two countries, growing out of a dispute over a boundary line, which is now in course of reference to The Hague. So, too, as between Peru and Ecuador, we were able, with the assistance of the great South American Republics—Brazil, Argentine, and Chile—to stop a war that was on the eve of breaking out, a war that involved chiefly a question of honor, and both countries became willing to submit it to negotiation and arbitration.

We have always believed that the course we pursued impressing Bolivia and Peru to settle their boundary dispute prevented hostilities between those countries. The situation was most acute when our advice was sought by both countries. We have been able to bring the heads of two contending factions in a civil war in Honduras onto the deck of an American vessel and there negotiate terms which have led to permanent peace. Now Honduras and Nicaragua ask us to assist them in paying their debts by agreeing in case of a default to accept responsibility for the collection of the revenues and to make

settlements in accordance with the contracts of indebtedness. These two treaties are pending in the Senate. I sincerely hope that they may be confirmed, because I do not know any other power that is so useful in the prevention of war as that which enables the United States Government to collect revenue of bankrupt and unstable governments and to apply them as law and the contracts made require, and thus to put the governments on their feet firmly. It has worked out with the Republic of Santo Domingo in a most remarkable way to the benefit of that country in the cause of peace, and we can be certain that it will work in the same way in the case of Honduras and Nicaragua if only the Senate will agree with the Executive and confirm the treaties made.

I have merely stated to you what has been accomplished in the present administration in the securing of peace among our South American and Central American friends. Treaties of arbitration in the matter of claims have been confirmed between them, and long steps were made by our predecessors in office in this direction. Indeed, the pacification of Cuba belongs to the last administration, and not to this. As we look back, therefore, it will not do to say that great strides have not been made in the direction of universal peace. Of course, the condition of Mexico may well make us hesitate to prophesy too strongly as to the future, but all the lovers of mankind hope that the present condition of that country may lead to the establishment of a firm government, and one in which there may not be the same occasion for popular unrest as that which gave rise to the recent collision.

For the further securing of peace, and as an example to all the world of the possibilities of the use of arbitration, we have invited England and France and Germany to make a treaty for the arbitration of all differences of an international character that in their nature can be adjudicated, and we have left out in this treaty those exceptions which have heretofore always been excluded from arbitrable controversies, to wit, questions of a nation's honor and of its vital interest. Of course, I can not say with positiveness that these treaties will all be made and confirmed. I can only say that the prospect of an agreement with the Executive of one of the countries is reasonably sure,

and we have every hope as to the other two, and that these three treaties will be followed by many of the same tenor with other countries if the original three are agreed upon and confirmed.

Objection has been made that an agreement to arbitrate a question of national honor ought not to be entered into for the reason that when once honor is affected one will never consent to have the question arbitrated, and therefore that to agree to do so in advance is to agree to do something that one will not be willing to do, and that one does not intend to do, and therefore it savors of hypocrisy and ought not to be adopted as a national policy. I can not concede the premises of this argument. I look upon a treaty of this sort as a self-denying ordinance, as a self-restricting obligation. It seems to be of the same character as the Constitution which the people as a whole set up and in which they impose checks upon their own power and limitations upon the method by which they exercise the ultimate sovereignty which is in them. It is not that they do not recognize that when the temptation comes to exercise arbitrary power they will not feel like exercising it, but it is that they deliberately impose these limitations upon their own action with the intention that they shall be effective, however averse they may be to yield to them when the occasion arises for their enforcement. And so in agreeing to arbitrate questions of national honor I see no reason why we may not agree to do so and that we may not have moral courage enough, in spite of our impulse to the contrary, to submit such questions to an impartial tribunal and await its judgment.

As I have had occasion to say before, there was a time when questions of honor could only be settled between gentlemen on the dueling field, and many a valuable life has been sacrificed to a standard of ethics which the world has now generally discarded. There is not the slightest reason why the same course may not be pursued in respect to questions of national honor. There is very little probability as between Great Britain and the United States any occasion will ever arise in which war would be possible. The same thing is true of France and Germany. Why, therefore, it is asked, is it necessary to make a treaty of arbitration to avoid wars that are only remotely possible? In-

ternational law is made up of international customs, traditions, and the formulation of international standards of ethics in treaties between civilized governments. A willingness of great countries like those of England, France, Germany, and the United States to submit all their differences, even of honor, to an impartial tribunal, will be a step forward in the cause of peace for the world that can hardly be overestimated.

I am not a wild enthusiast or a blind optimist. I do not look forward to a complete restoration of peace which can not be disturbed in the world even if these treaties are adopted. Morality of nations improve only step by step, and so the making and confirming of these treaties must be regarded only as a step, but a very long step, toward the securing of peace in the world. To you men who have seen war, to you who know its horrors, I appeal for the support of every practical instrument like this in making war less possible and peace more permanent.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT BEFORE THE CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOR CONVENTION, AT YOUNG'S PIER, ATLANTIC CITY, N. J., JULY 7, 1911.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOR, LADIES, AND GENTLEMEN: As I stand upon this platform, I am conscious of being in the presence of a religious force for progress and good in the world that had its genesis nearly 30 years ago, and now is making its influence felt completely around the world and through the expression and activity of 4,000,000 living souls.

This convention commemorates the organization of a movement based upon the principle that the time to influence men and women in their lives is in that formative period between youth and manhood, and that the making of the character of men and women is best achieved by training and practice rather than by instruction and preaching. It does not disown either instruction to the infants in the Sunday school or preaching to the adults in the church, but it furnishes a link between the two that in its actual influence has resulted in marvelous development, and shows itself in the conscious and enthusiastic demonstration of biennial meetings like this, in the history of its progress that are recounted at these conventions by representatives from all quarters of the globe. By insistence upon open confession of religious faith and the bringing forth of works needful for the expression of that faith and in the fellowship which follows a common confession and works, the Christian Endeavor has made its mark in the religious history of the world.

But I did not come here to discuss before an audience that knows them very much better than I the principles upon which your society is founded and the methods by which these principles have been embodied in the present glorious and useful development. I may take one sentence to express my profound and sincere admiration for Dr. Clark and his estimable wife, the founders of this society, who have lived long enough to see

it grow from one small organization in Williston, Me., to a world power for good, and, as the Chief Magistrate of this country, to recognize the debt it owes for their work and especially in the development of individual Christian character among the members of the Evangelical Protestant churches of this country. Such a movement can not but have the most beneficial effect upon the citizenship of a Nation like this, and I should be lacking in appreciation of these currents of popular reform and individual uplifting if I did not seize such an opportunity to pay a just tribute to those who have deserved so well of the Republic; for while this country has no state church and encourages the utmost freedom of religious belief and practice, it is a fundamental error to suppose that those who are responsible in any degree for the public welfare may not in every proper way encourage all instrumentalities for the betterment of the individual man, all moral and religious movements for his higher spiritual welfare, without regard to the denominational jurisdiction in which such movements take their source or exercise their influence. They necessarily tend to a leaven of the whole community and to the righteousness that exalteth a nation.

But, as I say, I did not come here to tell you about your own organization. I came to talk on a subject and cause in which I have, in common with all the civilized people of the world, an intense interest, and that is the avoidance of war by providing such instrumentalities for the settlement of international controversies as to make war remote, because unnecessary.

I observe that in your last convention, the twenty-fourth international convention, one of your resolutions was as follows:

Resolved, That as followers of the Prince of Peace we ally ourselves with every effort that is being made for the suppression of war. The immense and ever-increasing tax which war and preparations for war levy on peaceful industries and the frightful horrors of war itself demand that every lover of God and humanity should unite for its suppression.

In the last 25 years we have made great progress toward an international condition in which war is less likely than heretofore. It is true that in that time we have had several great wars—the war between China and Japan, the war between

Russia and Japan, the war between the United States and Spain, the war between England and the Boers, and perhaps some others. Nevertheless, as between the great countries of Europe which have armed themselves to the teeth since the German-French War of 1870 peace has been maintained; and under the inspiration of a common desire for peace treaties have been made with reference to arbitration at The Hague and for the establishment of a court at The Hague for the settlement of international disputes, and have pointed to the ideal of the utmost use in the promotion of the cause of peace. We have ameliorated in many ways the ancient cruelties of war by Red Cross agreements, and by the immunity of private property on land from destruction. Now we are agreeing upon what is called the declaration of London, which, if confirmed, as it seems likely to be, will take away from war on the sea those principles of lawful piracy that have always characterized in a naval war the dealing with the private property of the citizens of enemies.

Just to-day four great powers—England, Russia, Japan, and the United States—signed a treaty by which we agree in effect to banish the shooting of seals at sea, in order to preserve the valuable herds on the land and to allow them to propagate in such a way as to maintain the fur-seal industry and secure for human use the valuable furs that such seals furnish. It is the beginning, I hope, of the adoption of useful game laws for the open ocean, which has heretofore been subject to wanton and irresponsible use of men of every nation. It is the settlement by treaty of a controversy that has troubled these four nations for several generations, and it ought to be the cause of great congratulation.

By negotiation and mediation and the formation of arbitration agreements wars in the last decade have been stopped in Central and South America in a most gratifying number of instances. All wars have not been stopped in those countries lacking stability and power to enforce law and order, but that there is a marked improvement throughout Latin America in this regard, and especially in Central America, no one who has consulted the statistics of revolutions can fail to recognize.

The heroism and exhibition of the noblest qualities of the heart and soul and mind of man that war makes possible every student of history and of human nature must admit, but that this is accomplished with the horrible cost and sacrifice of human suffering and lives, and that an associated exhibition of the lowest moral qualities in man, of ambition, lust for power, of cruelty, ghoulish rapacity, and rapacity and corruption is equally true, and in very few cases, if any, can the historian say that the good of war was worth the awful sacrifice. And hence it is that we should all welcome, as far as we can, the effort to dispense with the necessity of war altogether. Even if that effort may not be entirely successful, every movement which tends to discourage war and to furnish a means for avoiding it ought to receive and does receive the earnest support of an organization that has the purposes and principles that actuate the Society of the Christian Endeavor.

I am glad to say that to-day we have reached such a point in the negotiations for a treaty of universal arbitration with one of the great European powers that we can confidently predict the signing of a satisfactory treaty. The arbitration treaty heretofore with Great Britain and other countries has excepted from the causes which may be arbitrated those which involved the vital interests of either party or its honor. The treaty which we are now closing with Great Britain eliminates these exceptions, and provides that all questions of international concern of a justiciable character shall be submitted to the arbitration of an impartial tribunal, and that whenever differences arise before they are submitted to arbitration at all, they shall be taken up by a commission composed of two or more representatives from each Government that shall investigate the controversy and recommend a solution, without arbitration if possible, and then shall decide whether the issue is capable of arbitration; and, if so, the arbitration shall take place. In this way the treaty in one sense, instead of making arbitration necessary, interposes mediation of a year between the happening of the differences and the bringing of the matter to arbitration, with the growing possibility, as the ruffled feelings of the nation may be smoothed out by time, that the difference may be adjusted

by mediation instead of judicial action, but holding judicial action as the ultimate resort to prevent war.

I am exceedingly hopeful that other countries beside Great Britain will accept the form of the treaty or one like it, and that we may have half a dozen treaties with the European countries looking toward arbitration of international differences. This will not abolish war, but it will provide a most effective and forcible instrument for avoiding it in many cases. Of course war between Great Britain and the United States, between France and the United States, and between Germany and the United States is quite remote; but the adoption by these great countries of arbitration and mediation as a means of meeting all controversies must have the most healthy moral effect upon the world at large, and must assist all the friends of peace in their effort to make it permanent. To this audience and this great society with its world-wide influence, I do not hesitate to appeal to give the tremendous weight of its support to such a cause.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT AT THE PEACE JUBILEE CELEBRATION AT
MANASSAS, VA., JULY 21, 1911.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It is so ordained that we do not enjoy to the full those things which come to us without effort. I shall enjoy my visit to Manassas to the full, for I have been to some effort to get here. I came with a party of Senators and Representatives from Washington. We came very slowly—much more slowly than those Senators and Representatives came back to Washington 50 years ago. When we look back to that period a feeling of sadness must overcome us, for that is a period that we dislike to look back upon, a period of discouragement and sorrow, reviving in our minds all the great strain and trial of that awful struggle. I don't know whether it might have been avoided; I don't know whether we might have brought about the same results in a peaceful way; but I do know that in that struggle each side showed a strength that neither side had known that it possessed—developed a strength of character to the knowledge of the entire world that the world had not known of before.

I deplore war. I wish it could be abolished entirely. But we may all rejoice that in that awful test the greatness of the American people was developed. There we showed our ability to fight out our differences to the very death and to make the greatest nation in the world after having had the greatest civil war the world had ever witnessed.

The greatest ambition I have as President of the United States is to do everything sensible and everything reasonably possible to bring the two sections of the country even closer together, if that be possible—to make them feel in the South, as well as in the North, that the Supreme Court of the United States is their Supreme Court, the Congress their Congress, the President of the United States their President.

I look to you veterans of the Civil War that saw real war to support the administration and the Government in every effort

made by it to secure peace the world over. And I am glad to announce to-day that as England has agreed, so France has signified her willingness to enter upon the same treaty for the arbitration of any differences that may exist, both treaties to be signed within the next ten days. This, I am hopeful, will be followed shortly by a like step on the part of three other countries. I bring this news first to you veterans of the war, because I know that you, above all others, have learned sacredly to regard the great blessings of peace.

A visit to Virginia conjures up sweet reminiscences—reminiscences of Virginia beauty, chivalry, and hospitality. I am glad to be on the soil of Virginia—some of it has adhered to me. I am sorry to be late, but Virginia is a hospitable State and her soil and her streams gather about one and hinder one's movements.

It had been announced that I was coming here to deliver an address. I came merely to say how-de-do; to express to you my pleasure in this great reunion and my joy at being received by hospitable Virginia.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT TO THE METHODIST CHAUTAUQUA, AT MOUNTAIN LAKE PARK, MD., AUGUST 7, 1911.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I have snatched a day out of my official work to come up into this delightful mountain country to talk to you about peace.

I am not a blind optimist nor a wild enthusiast in the advocacy of an immediate change of human nature as it exhibits itself in the individual man or in the aggregation of men in human governments. I realize that moral changes among all the people and in the countries of the world take place step by step, and that progress is made only by moderate advances from time to time. I know that in the last 30 years the armaments of the great powers, especially in the main means of naval attack and defense, have increased enormously, and a surface view of this tendency would discourage one in the hope that we are coming nearer to an era of universal peace. But it will be found on study that while preparations for war have been greater than ever before, actual conflicts are much less, and that the very preparations, with their heavy expense and with the prospect of bankrupting losses in actual battle and campaigns, have operated more than ever before as deterrent of war and promoting peace.

Twice in public addresses I expressed the view that arbitration as a means of settling differences between the nations might be greatly extended to include even those things which have heretofore been excluded, to wit, questions of honor and of vital interest. The eagerness and enthusiasm with which those tentative and informal proposals were received by the great men of England of both parties and by statesmen of many other countries is perhaps the most encouraging circumstance in a century for those who longed for the end of war. It was not that the statesmen and the nations thus welcoming the proposal intended to disarm or to stop their preparations for possible war, but it was that they welcomed from the bottom

of their hearts every attempt to substitute for war a peaceful means for the settlement of the controversies between nations, with the hope that when the instrumentality shall have proved itself effective as a substitute for war then the heavy and bankrupting burdens of present war preparations may be substantially reduced.

I have been surprised to note with what fervor the plain people of every nation welcome the proposal of universal arbitration, not because their real interest in the practical adoption of the plan is not greater than all other classes in the community, but because it is a somewhat abstruse cause, in the success of which they might not be expected to take an immediate interest. Of course in a war it is the common, plain people that have to bear most of the suffering. They have to pay most of the taxes; they have to do most of the fighting; and they secure the least benefit and the least glory.

The tentative proposals to which I have referred led naturally on to negotiations between Great Britain and this country and between France and this country, and they have now resulted in the signing of formal treaties of what may be called "universal arbitration." They provide that every question of a justiciable nature shall be submitted to a tribunal of arbitration, and they define what justiciable means. It is any issue between the nations that can be properly settled upon the principles of law and equity, as those are understood in law and in international law. There are, of course, questions of policy with respect to which each nation must exercise its own discretion, and in doing so is entirely within its legal and equitable right, and however its action may affect the other nation it is not the proper subject of controversy. But even with reference to such questions, it is proposed to submit those to an impartial commission, in which both countries are equally represented, and they are to consider the matter for a year and then decide, first, whether the matters are capable of arbitration, and, if not, they are to recommend a settlement. If the controversies are found by the commission to be capable of arbitration, and not to be settled by negotiations, then the countries are bound to arbitrate them and accept the decision. The machinery thus provided will practically dispose of every question so far as

it is a war-inducing issue. A year's pondering over matters we can be sure will give such pause to the hot feeling of either nation as to lead to a sensible and peaceful solution. Indeed, with the preliminary commission for consideration of the issues and recommendation for their proper settlement, the treaty may be called almost a treaty not only to avoid war but even to avoid arbitration, for it is only in the last instance, after the commission shall have failed in a year's time to suggest a satisfactory solution, that even arbitration is to be resorted to.

In the old treaty of arbitration with Great Britain the subjects of national honor and of vital interest were excepted from those which were to be considered by a tribunal of arbitration. This treaty is made for the purpose of eliminating those exceptions, and they are now subject to arbitration within the limitations of the treaty.

The treaty-making power in the United States is vested by the Constitution in the Executive and the Senate, it being required that each treaty before it can become effective shall be advised and assented to by the Senate, two-thirds of that body assenting. Hence binding action with respect to international contracts, like those for arbitration, can only be had by the concurrent action of the Executive and the Senate. Therefore, it is provided in these new arbitration treaties that while the United States and Great Britain or the United States and France agree to arbitrate every question within the terms of the treaty, the special agreement of submission, or the terms of submission, as they are sometimes called, in each instance arising when the operation of the treaty is invoked, shall be considered and acted upon by the same authority which entered into the main treaty of arbitration. In other words, by this treaty, if it is ratified, the Executive and the Senate, representing the United States, agree to settle all their differences, as described in the treaty, by arbitration or through a commission.

When a concrete instance of a cause of difference or controversy arises, then the obligations of the main treaty require the United States, through its lawfully constituted authority, to wit, the Executive and the Senate, to make the requisite agreement and submission of terms by which the machinery created in the treaty shall be set in motion, the issue defined, and the question

decided. Should the treaty be ratified, the Senate, exactly as the Executive, will be in honor bound by its obligations in good faith to perform the offices which the main treaty provides shall be performed on the side of the United States, and then to abide the result, and to acquiesce, or in so far as may be, perform and execute the judgment of the tribunal.

I observe that there is some suggestion that by ratifying this treaty the Senate may in some way abdicate its functions of treaty making. I confess myself unable to perceive the substance in such a point. The fact that the Senate has the power to make a treaty necessarily involves its power to bind itself as part of the Government to the obligations of the treaty. This is inherent in the treaty-making power. From time immemorial governments have bound themselves to abide the judgment of third parties in controversies between them. In what respect does the Senate treaty-making power differ from that of the Executive, or of any government in all times past, that it may not agree, on behalf of the nation, to abide the judgment of an impartial tribunal; or by treaty to establish a tribunal to consider a certain class of cases and decide them, whether one or many, whether existing or in the future, or to accord to the tribunal itself, or some other impartial commission, not only the power to decide certain issues, but also to decide whether the issue which arises comes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal in accordance with the terms of the treaty. One of the commonest kinds of questions that comes before any court is that of deciding its own jurisdiction in accordance with the law. What is there then to prevent the Senate from uniting with the Executive in agreeing to settle future controversies of a given description in a treaty by the judgment of an impartial tribunal, and to submit to that tribunal not only the question how the issue ought to be decided, but also as a condition precedent whether the issue is within the terms of the treaty already made?

Treaties with England and France are of the utmost importance, not in the actual prevention of war between those countries, because the danger of such a cataclysm as that is, thank God, most remote, but they are most important as steps toward

the settlement of all international controversies between all countries by peaceable means and by arbitration. The fact that two great nations like Great Britain and the United States, or like France and the United States, should be willing to submit all controversies to a peaceful and impartial tribunal can not but work for righteousness among the nations, and for a willingness on their part to adopt the same means for the settlement of international disputes. To have these treaties not ratified, therefore, by the Senate of the United States, or to have any hesitation and discussion of a serious character in respect to them would halt the movement toward general peace which has made substantial advance in the last 10 years. To secure the ratification of the treaties, therefore, appeal must be made to the moral sense of the Nation; and while that is not entirely in keeping of the churches, certainly they may exert a powerful influence in the promotion of any effective instrumentality to secure permanent peace. Therefore, I invoke your aid as a branch of the great Methodist Church to bring all the influence you can bring to secure the confirmation of the treaties now made, and of those which may be made hereafter of a similar tenor with other countries. This movement has attracted the attention not only of England and France, but of all the countries of Europe and of the Orient. It is not too much to hope that there are a number of others who will be willing now to sign the same kind of treaties as those already made, and that we may ultimately have a network of such agreements, making long strides toward universal peace.

On Saturday last the Senate not only made public the treaties now negotiated by the United States with Great Britain and France for universal arbitration, but they also made public treaties between the United States and Nicaragua and between the United States and Honduras. One of the encouraging and marked tendencies in international matters is the increasing sense of responsibility that powerful nations are acquiring in respect to bad government and human suffering under bad government in other countries and nations. In our own country this is evidenced by the Spanish War, which was undertaken for the benefit of improving the condition of the people of Cuba. It is evidenced by the time and money and effort

which have been spent for the last 10 years in improving the Philippines. It is evidenced by the intervention in the last administration to prevent a revolution in Cuba. It is evidenced by the wonderfully successful intervention by Theodore Roosevelt as President of the United States in securing peace between Russia and Japan. It is evidenced by the treaty made in the last administration with Santo Domingo, by which we agreed to appoint agents to collect the revenue of Santo Domingo and to secure their application to the wiping out of a national debt which was growing beyond any hope of liquidation. One revolution succeeded another in that unfortunate country, and its history was nothing but one of blood and battle, and its people suffered intense misery from the stagnation and halting of all progress that continual wars compelled.

In respect of the Central American Republics we occupy a peculiar position. By the assertion of the Monroe doctrine we decline to allow any European country to acquire further territory in this hemisphere at the expense of any of the existing Republics, and as against such an invasion the Monroe doctrine puts us in the attitude of, in effect, guaranteeing their integrity. When, therefore, European nations, in the enforcement of the debts due to their subjects, threaten measures of force against any Central American Republic which may lead to an appropriation of its territory we can not be indifferent, and we must intervene to prevent the logical outcome of such forceful measures. But how can we act as guardian for those Republics in their dealings with European nations and their subjects unless we assume some responsibility to enable those countries to liquidate their indebtedness and readjust it on an equitable basis? It is not necessary in doing so for us to assume any financial responsibility. It is not necessary for us in doing so to use our Army and Navy for the purpose. All we have to do is to agree to do what we did in Santo Domingo, or less, to wit, to agree to appoint agents to collect the revenues of these Republics when default shall occur and apply the money in accordance with the contracts. That is a very slight responsibility for us to meet as compared with the power we assert under the Monroe doctrine, to wit, to forcibly exclude all European countries from intervention and appropriation of the soil

of these Republics. There is no issue before the Senate so acute in respect to the cause of peace as the confirmation of those Central American treaties. If those Republics are loaded with debts, equitable and inequitable, by our aid, extended in the way I have described, through those treaties, they have an opportunity to liquidate all their indebtedness on an equitable basis.

The very existence of the treaty and our obligation to take charge of the customhouses in case of a default has proven in the instance of Santo Domingo to be a most powerful means of preventing sedition, rebellion, local disorders, and war. Why should we withhold our aid, extended once to Santo Domingo, to these other countries equally deserving and equally under our guardianship? Is it not better thus to anticipate trouble and ward it off by mere civil arrangements that involve but little burden than to wait until war follows, until European nations undertake a forcible collection of their debts, and when we have come face to face with an European controversy and continuous wars in the Central American Republics themselves? I submit to you, my friends, that while I admit the greater importance of the universal treaties of arbitration in the long run, and as affecting the world at large, yet in respect of American interests—in respect of peace in this hemisphere—they are not equal in importance to the confirmation of these Central American treaties. The Senate has properly published them to the world for the purpose of enabling the people to examine them, to study them, and to express their opinion upon them, and I venture to hope that popular consideration of them will lead to such emphatic approval that the requisite majority in the Senate may give the treaties life and Honduras and Nicaragua and other similarly situated countries the relief they so desperately need. In the halt of business and of all progress that their impossible financial condition now imposes upon them, the poor people of these Republics are suffering from want and starvation, though living in a country of vast resources, which, under the blessing of peace and the investment of capital, could be made to yield comfort and happiness to every soul of them.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT AT THE METHODIST CONFERENCE, OCEAN GROVE, N. J., AUGUST 15, 1911.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I have come here to this great gathering at the invitation of your executive committee, and at the special instance of Gov. Murphy and Congressman Andrus. I am glad to have the privilege of meeting your distinguished governor of New Jersey, Gov. Wilson, and to receive from him the welcome of the State.

These are busy days in Washington, and it has cost me something in the matter of time and effort to accept your hospitable invitation. I could not, however, forego the opportunity of coming to talk to you on a subject in which I know that both you and I are very deeply interested. I mean the cause of the promotion of peace among the nations.

Moral progress, of course, begins with the individual, and unless you can find it there we are not likely to find it in any group of individuals, or in the millions of individuals that make a state. Hence we must expect that the code of morals that governs the association of individuals is a higher one than that which obtains in the relations between nations. Still, while progress among individuals means progress at a slower rate among nations in this regard, it is inevitable that the method of settling differences and controversies between individuals should furnish a precedent and a suggestion for a similar method of settling controversies between nations.

There was a time in the English law when litigants might demand and have a settlement of a controversy by what was called "wager of battle," but as civilization progressed, wager of battle fell into disuse, and civil courts furnished the means by which men were able to live with each other, adjust their controversies, and continue members of the same society. As between nations, the wager of battle has not been laid aside, and we are still making treaties and arrangements by which the method of conducting war shall be limited to what is thought to

be a civilized manner of conducting it, and unnecessary cruelties are forbidden and eliminated.

Now the question which the good people of all countries are agitating is whether we can not find something satisfactory which can be substituted for war as a means of settling international controversies. The closer acquaintance of nations with each other, the greater community of interest among them, the increase in the family feeling between them all press toward an avoidance of war and a settlement of controversies otherwise. It is this real increase in the actual brotherhood of man and of the interest of the citizen or subject of one country in the citizen or subject of another, that has strengthened the yearning on the part of all peoples for some sort of a temple of justice in which kings and nations may be parties, and hearings and judgments may take the place of battles and capitulations. This feeling has been rendered stronger and stronger by the churches. The missionaries who have been sent out by civilized nations into uncivilized portions of the globe have carried the doctrine of the brotherhood of man into actual deeds of mercy and assistance. These missionaries have been nothing but the forerunners of civilization in the parts which they have visited, and the function that they have played in the spread of civilization, everyone familiar with the Orient and the non-Christian parts of the world can testify.

The same spirit which prompts the sending of missionaries into distant parts of the globe to aid the less progressive inhabitants of those sections is the spirit which is roused to enthusiasm and energetic action in the promotion of effective means for delaying war or making it less frequent and of promoting peace.

There are a few things that ought to be said with reference to the spirit in which we approach plans for the settlement of controversies without resort to war. In the first place, if we insist upon a plan in which we are always likely to win the controversy, the plan will not probably approve itself to the person or nation with whom we propose to make the agreement. If we are afraid to submit to an impartial tribunal, lest we may lose our case, then we would better go back to war as the only means of settling international controversies when negotiation

fails. When we enter into an arbitration, or an agreement to submit our differences to an impartial tribunal, we must "play the game." We must be willing to lose, as we are anxious to win. It is like the old orthodox view that "we must be willing to be damned in order that we may be saved." Therefore, it seems to me of much importance that in considering what ought to be done, and what can be done in constituting an international court for the settlement of international differences, the parties should come to feel that the court is for the purpose of settling, one way or the other, real international differences, the settlement of which will be a great disappointment to one or the other of the parties. It is generally quite impossible for a court to decide a case so that both parties shall like the decision, and a court to decide between nations can not find it any more easy than a domestic court to do this. We can not make omelets without breaking eggs; we can not submit international questions to arbitration without the prospect of losing, and if arbitration is to be effected, and is to cover the ground that shall really promote the cause of peace and prevent war, it must cover questions of the utmost interest to both countries, and therefore the loss of one country in the contest must be of course a serious matter to that country; and when it comes into an agreement for arbitration it must be willing to face the disappointment that comes from a serious loss thus imposed by an arbitral decision. If the subject of arbitration is merely for discussion in peace societies, and is only for the purpose of furnishing a text for an address like that I am delivering to you, and if the result is not to mean real victory for one party and real defeat for the other, certainly the time of diplomatic officers, who have many other things to do, ought not to be wasted on it.

I am very serious in my advocacy of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes, and I believe that you are. I am willing to abide an adverse decision in a court of arbitration for my own country, even though it may impose a serious loss upon her, if the system of arbitration is to be made permanent and the court is of such a character that when I have just cause I can count on receiving a just judgment. I emphasize these things because as between individuals in

society we differentiate with clearness between the strength and the weakness of a man's claim in his contest with others in civil society; but when we come to discuss national affairs and the interest of our country we are all prone to take up the cry "For my country always! May she always be right; but, whether right or wrong, for my country!" Now, where war is the only method of arbitrament, it is impracticable for one citizen to set up against the draft that may be made upon him by his country to sustain her in a war that her cause is not a just one; but supposing war to be out of the question, we should have no objection to submitting our claims to a just court, and we ought to abide in peace its judgment that we do not have a just cause, however hurtful it may be to our national pride and however prejudicial to our national pecuniary or material interest. In other words, ladies and gentlemen, if we are going into the arbitration game, if I may call it such, we must play it through to the end, and we must take our hard knocks with equanimity, as we expect others to take theirs, with the hope and knowledge that the disadvantages that may accrue to each party can never equal the horrible losses, the cruelty, and the wickedness of war.

We have made progress among the nations in the cause of peace. At the instance of the Emperor of Russia The Hague conferences were held and The Hague tribunal established. This was, of course, with exceptions and conditions and provisions, all of which limit the kinds of cases that go into that court, and so we can not say that there is a general provision for the arbitration of all questions between nations, but there is the machinery, there is a basis upon which future action can be taken, and we may look forward with reasonable hope to an enlargement of the office of The Hague court until after a while it shall be a general international court, in which all nations shall be willing to put their claims and their defenses for consideration and decision. Heretofore agreements for arbitration generally excepted questions of national honor and of vital interest. It has always seemed to me that these exceptions were so broad that they excluded a great many important questions that might just as well be arbitrated as any other, and so I suggested last year that I would be willing to take the re-

sponsibility as President of initiating a treaty with one or more important governments for the arbitration of all international differences, even though they did include those of national honor and of vital interest. That was a public declaration and it was soon publicly accepted both by England and France. Negotiations were carried on with a full knowledge of both countries, and after an agreement was reached a synopsis of it was issued by the Secretary of State, and the nations concerned and the world generally know the substance of the treaties. After some months in the preparation of the exact language it was submitted to the Senate.

The treaties provide that all questions that are justiciable arising between England and this country and France and this country shall be arbitrated and submitted either to The Hague or some other international court. That the question shall be justiciable as defined in the first clause of the treaty—first, it must be between the two countries to the treaty; second, it must relate to an international matter; third, both parties must be concerned in the matter; fourth, the concern of the complaining nation must be based upon a claim of right under a treaty or otherwise; fifth, the difference must be capable of being adjusted by the application of the rules of law and equity, domestic or international. If all these elements are found to exist in respect to the difference between the two nations, then it is an arbitral difference within the meaning of Article I of the treaty. If the two powers can not agree that a specific difference between them is arbitrable, then provision is made for the appointment of a commission to consist of three representatives of one power and three representatives of the other, who are to meet and consider what the difference is, whether it can be ended by negotiation, to recommend a solution, if possible, and if not, then to determine whether the issue is arbitrable, and if five-sixths of the commission—that is, three of one side and two of the other—shall agree that it is arbitrable, then it is to be submitted under the form prepared in the treaty to arbitration under a special agreement, which, in the case of the United States, is to be signed by the Executive and concurred in by the Senate.

I would have been willing myself to provide that all differences of opinion on international matters should be submitted to a court of arbitration for its decision, and to have left it to the court itself to say whether the difference arising could be properly settled by arbitration. In other words, I believe in arbitration to a point that I am willing to arbitrate anything in which I believe I have a good cause, and if I don't believe I have a good cause I wish to give it up in advance of arbitration. But public opinion is perhaps not so far advanced as this, and therefore the commission plan was devised by which the question of the arbitrable character of the controversy was left to a joint high commission, consisting of three representatives of each party, it being supposed that neither party would feel itself in danger of an unjust decision as to the arbitrable character of a difference in a tribunal in which three of the persons were their own fellow citizens appointed by their Executive, and in our case with the consent of the Senate. . .

Having completed the two treaties with England and France, I submitted them to the Senate for their advice and consent to my ratification of them. Of course I could have called the Senate in advance of the making of the treaties, and it would not have been a departure from the proper method for me to have learned in advance the action the Senate might take upon such a question. But I had myself publicly declared my willingness to initiate such a treaty, and so far as my authority went to carry it to a successful negotiation. It did not seem wise, therefore, to submit the matter to the Senate until after it had taken definite form, and until after we had found that the other countries were willing to join us in such treaties. Now, I freely concede that it is within the power of the Senate in its function of advising and consenting to the treaties, either to reject them or to amend them. They do not amend the treaties, strictly speaking, they merely continue the negotiation by suggesting another form to be submitted to the other party to the treaty, and that I understand is what the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate has done, to wit, it has stricken out the third clause, vesting the commission of six commissioners, three from each side, with the power to determine whether differ-

ences are arbitrable within the meaning of the first section, and to bind both countries when the vote is five out of six in the commission to the acceptance of a judgment by arbitration upon such issue. I think this is a very important part of the treaty. I think it is one of those pledges of good faith in entering into the treaty that is essential to take it a step forward in the adjustment of international controversies. When we agree that we will submit all justiciable controversies to the judgment of an arbitration, and decline to allow anybody to decide what is justiciable except ourselves, we give little sanction or pledge in advance of our willingness and anxiety to settle all possible controversies by arbitration. The treaty then is likely to become a mere expression of a desire to arbitrate where we think we can arbitrate without losing, and where our material or other interests will not suffer by defeat, or where the case is so clear that we are certain to win. At least this is the opportunity it affords when we reserve to ourselves the right to decide what we regard as justiciable when the case arises. If this is to be a real advance, then we must be willing to risk something in making the treaty.

But it is said that we are asking the Senate, in consenting to the ratification of these treaties, to abdicate some of their functions. I confess I follow this claim with very little sympathy or acquiescence. The Senate is part of the treaty-making power of the country. A treaty is a contract. It is an agreement by which, if the Government of the United States is a party, those who represent it may bind it to a certain course of action in the future. That is involved in the power to make a treaty itself. A contract—a treaty—is a stipulation as to the future conduct of those who enter into it. Now, if we have power to enter into arbitration, we have the power to agree to enter into arbitration under conditions that are described in the treaty, and as we have the right to leave the interests of the country to a judgment of the court, to which it is submitted by agreement, we certainly have the right to submit to that court to decide whether the particular instance and difference which has arisen, or shall arise in the future, is within the description of the treaty and of the obligation which we entered into

in the treaty. To say that this is an abdication of the functions of the Senate is to say that it is not the function of the Senate to make an agreement at all which shall bind the Government. I have no desire to minimize in the slightest degree the importance of the Senate as part of the treaty-making power. I have no desire to minimize its importance in the framework of the Government which the drafters of the Constitution founded. It furnishes a second legislative Chamber of Members, with a six years' tenure, which insures a proper check in the sober consideration of legislation sent over to it by the House of Representatives, and it properly divides with the Executive the power and responsibility of shaping our international relations. But when the prerogatives of the Senate are spoken of, the term "prerogative" does not make the power which it intends the Senate has any more sacred than the power of the Executive in respect to the same subject matter. If the Executive and the Senate acting together may make a contract of submission to arbitration, there is very little limitation upon the scope of the questions which they have power to submit. The treaty-making power is a very broad one, and it is not straining it in the slightest to include within it the power to make a treaty of arbitration, by which a certain class of questions described in the treaty are to be submitted to arbitration, and by which the power shall be committed to a tribunal of arbitration to decide whether future instances arising are within the class described in the treaty or not.

I had hoped that the treaties, when submitted to the Senate, would meet with early ratification and concurrence. In this I have been disappointed, but I do not wish to be put in an attitude of expressing impatience at a proper deliberation by the Senate on matters of so great importance as this. On the contrary, I urge such delay and deliberation, because I am convinced that longer consideration will satisfy the Members of the Senate that the chief objection which seems to be made to the third clause of the treaty has no weight in it whatever. Of course, there is a difference between the argument directed to whether the Senate has the power to submit to a commission the question whether a difference is arbitrable or not, and the

policy of doing so. I confess myself unable to find any just argument upon which a defect in the power of the Senate for this purpose can be urged.

The policy of the matter presents a somewhat different issue and makes me recur to the subject matter of my remarks earlier in this address. If we are in earnest in favor of arbitration, and hope to make it a means of dispensing with war and of settling real controversies, then we must be willing to risk defeat in arbitration, and on important matters, as we may earnestly hope for success, and I, for one, in my profound desire to find some means of avoiding the awful cost and horrors of war, am ready to run the risk and go fully to the point of submitting important international differences to a tribunal where we may win or lose.

I venture thus, my friends, to point out the differences that may arise between the Executive and the Senate in this matter. That an agreement may be reached, of course, I sincerely hope. The powers of the Senate, as well as those of the Executive, are all derived from the people. Neither is more sacred than the other. As I have already said, I am the last person to minimize the importance of the Senate's retaining its constitutional powers, and of its refusing to abdicate any function which that instrument gives it. I think its sensitiveness in regard to its power ought to be respected and not criticized or made light of, because if the balance of power in the Constitution between the Executive and the Senate and the House of Representatives and the judiciary is to be maintained, one of the chief hopes of its maintenance lies in the assertion of each branch of what its powers are and its refusal to abate any of them. Still, if the Senate, or any Members of it, should think that its powers are greater or less than they are, and the limitations they insist upon interfere with progress toward peace, or any other great national or international policy, the question whether they are right or not must ultimately be referred back to the people whose representatives the Members of the Senate are, for we all, as I say, have derived our powers from the people, as the ultimate source of power, and in case of disagreement the proper place for discussion of such an issue is before the people.

The cause is sufficiently great to warrant the straining of effort to secure treaties like those which make for international peace. If I am wrong in my judgment, and I do not claim infallibility, and know that the enthusiasm of the cause may sometimes warp judgment, I am quite willing to abide the ultimate judgment of the people; but I deem it my duty, until I shall receive an adverse decision, to urge my views upon the Senate, and to invoke the attention of the people to these questions and such expression of opinion by them as shall influence a ratification of the treaties as they were signed.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT TAFT TO THE GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC
AT CONVENTION HALL, ROCHESTER, N. Y., AUGUST 23, 1911.

MEN OF THE GRAND ARMY: I thank you for this invitation to be present at your annual encampment. I was present at your annual meeting in Toledo three years ago, and I am always glad, when opportunity offers, to testify to my high appreciation of your body as a civic organization of the greatest usefulness. I say "civic organization," for it certainly is not now a military organization, although it was organized to keep in fresh and sacred memory the deeds of the greatest military organization that probably ever existed—the Grand Army of the Republic as it was in 1865.

I congratulate you that there are no politics in the Grand Army; that you are a nonpartisan body, and that each man votes his sentiments without fear or the influence of his fellows. I am glad to know that, important as the body is, widespread as is its membership through the country, no suggestions of outside influence are permitted to have weight in your councils or the selection of your leaders.

I hope you may continue to have meetings as long as there are two survivors of your host, and then that, in the Sons of Veterans, may be continued the traditions of courage, patriotism, and self-sacrifice, liberty, fraternity, and loyalty, that mark your present organization.

It is now half a century since the conflict of arms began in which one half of this country was arrayed against the other half. In this annual gathering of the survivors of the men who in that contest fought to preserve the Union and to unite again the contending forces, one becomes necessarily reminiscent of the conditions that prevailed before the war began, and in the retrospect marks the wonderful change in our national conditions which this 50 years have witnessed.

How dark must have been the outlook of any lover of his country, whether he lived in the North or in the South, who

understood or measured the depth of the conviction of the North as to the necessity for maintaining the Union without slavery, or the conviction of the South as to the importance of sustaining slavery as an economic institution and State rights as a principle of constitutional construction!

For years the cleavage had manifested itself in Congress, in politics, and in society, and Lincoln's declaration that the country could not remain half free and half slave crystallized the sentiment of those who saw clearly the inevitable tendency of public opinion in the North and in the South. How discouraged must have been the philosophers of those days who sought for some peaceful solution, or a solution by arms which would not so rend the country as to destroy the possibility of its great future! The problem seemed insoluble, and yet we have worked it out. It was done by a tremendous war, a conflict that developed an unsuspected strength on both sides—an energy and courage in the North and brave power of resistance to the uttermost in the South. It is pointed out that the resources of the North exceeded those of the South. That is doubtless true, but the problem that the North had was affirmative; the problem that the South had was negative. The problem of the North was "capture, tranquillization, and reunion"; the problem of the South was "resistance" only. What statesman, what prophet in the dark days of the fifties and 1860 and 1861 could look forward from a Nation of 30,000,000, rent by this fundamental cause of difference and driven into bloody contest, to a Nation to-day of 90,000,000, with a prosperity, a wealth per capita, and a condition of comfort for the individual, and an equality of opportunity that has never been equaled in the world? When we contemplate what we have lived through and what has been accomplished, it ought to encourage us to feel that the problems before us are slight in comparison with those we have solved; and here, in the presence of the survivors of those men who saved the country and helped to solve that problem 50 years ago, I would draw a lesson that, it seems to me, is of the utmost usefulness in times like these. Our very prosperity and the accumulation of our wealth have brought other problems, elusive and difficult in their settlement, and have prompted a higher civic ambition with reference to the

condition of the individual and his equality of opportunity, and with reference to use of wealth by its owners and restrictions upon methods of use unduly oppressive to competitors and to the public at large.

These higher aims for the betterment of society, these new evils growing out of the concentration of wealth, and these combinations which, properly controlled, are a great good in the reduction of the cost of production, have invited from the active-minded of to-day suggestions of reform that are so extreme that the medicine to many of us seems worse than the disease. Those who are charged with the responsibility and sobered with the difficulties find ourselves in the middle of the road resisting the tendency to socialism on the one hand and the inertia of reactionary contentment with present evils and ambition for greater concentration of financial power on the other; but we are gradually solving the problem. The present does not bring difficulties as great as you had to meet and overcome in '61. It may be a longer fight, because it will not involve violence or the shedding of blood, but it must and will be solved peacefully and by the earnest effort of the level-headed, the practical, and the courageous among us, and by reducing the influence of the demagogue and theoretical extremists on the one hand and the reactionary influence of combinations of wealth on politics and progress on the other. Its solution will be consistent with the preservation of our ancient institutions of personal liberty and private property under the Constitution. The message that you bear, with your experience and your success, to those of us struggling now with the problem is that, however dark at times the situation seems, so long as we retain in this country a God-fearing, sober, intelligent people, we can count in the long run upon their working out safely and sanely the problems set before them, no matter how many mistakes in the form of nostrums they may be led into by the speciousness of half-baked theories of progress, no matter how often they may have been defeated in their purpose by the temporary success of undue influence of concentrated wealth.

Such anniversaries as these of the heroes that survived the awful conflict of 1861 to 1865 are useful in many ways. In the first place, they must give to you who participate an intense joy

in the quickening of the bond of common recollection and association formed in those days of strife of the past, when you all were exposed to the dangers of the battlefield, and only part lived to tell the tale. In the next place, such a union and demonstration furnish a lesson to the youth of the country, and prompt them to a willingness to enlist in her support whenever new exigencies shall arise calling for the sacrifice; and, finally, it revives through the Nation at large the useful recollection of the difficulties through which the country has come, and over which it has triumphed, and gives new courage and new hope to those who are struggling with present difficulties. This thought has come to me time and time again since I have had the responsibility of the Presidency; and when there seemed troubles and burdens that were hard to bear my mind has reverted to those which Lincoln carried, and in comparison with his sad mental struggles, mine have seemed boyish and of little weight.

But I did not come here, my friends, to discuss the state of the Nation at large, and these remarks of mine are made only as an introduction to the subject of arbitration and peace.

You are here to commemorate the fact of war and the sacrifice that war made necessary and the success that attended your struggles in battle. But you are not here to praise war or to advocate its continuance. You are the first to admit that the awful horrors that are inevitable in war should be avoided if possible. You know better than those of us who have had no experience how dreadful it is, what cruelties it involves, what painful sacrifices on the part of mother, and wife, and daughter it entails. You can not be blind to the devilish instincts it excites, to the corruption and demoralization that follow in its train. These things you know by actual experience, and this it is that makes you an audience to whom appeals in behalf of progress toward universal peace can be properly made.

Of course every sensible man knows that if no other means is furnished for the settlement of international controversies but negotiation, the time is likely to come when that means will fail, and then war will ensue. The nations of the globe, especially those in close proximity to each other, are armed

to the teeth and with the most expensive modern armament, to be ready, when the possibility of other settlement shall have passed, to defend themselves and injure their opponents. The cost of modern armament is so great and the cataclysmic effect of modern wars is so pronounced that I believe them to be less frequent than in the past, and in this way the preparations for war have possibly reduced its probability rather than increased it. But we can be confident that war will not disappear unless some method is furnished which shall satisfactorily settle the differences that must in the nature of things arise between the nations of the world. Of course, between individuals in a community the differences which arise are settled in courts. We have now treaties for arbitration which are made for the purpose of settling controversies that arise between us and other countries, but there are exceptions in the description of the differences that are to be arbitrated under those treaties which exclude questions of honor and vital interest. I need not stop to discuss the meaning of those terms except to say that they are wide enough to exclude from the effect of the treaties many questions that may arise between nations which are more likely to produce war than the questions included in the treaties. I ventured last year and the year before in one or two public addresses to express the opinion that there was no reason why such questions could not be arbitrated as other questions. This expression at length awakened a cordial response both in England and in France, and it has led to the negotiation of two treaties—one with England and one with France. Those treaties have gone to the Senate and are now under consideration in that body. The majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations has reported in favor of an amendment to the treaties, and a minority is in favor of their adoption as they are, with a possible suggestion in the act of ratification as to their construction. I do not come before you in opposition to the Senate, and I do not wish to criticize the majority of the committee that has reported an amendment. I am only anxious to promote as full a public discussion of the questions now arising in respect to the confirmation of the treaties as possible, because I feel confident that a public discussion of the matter, followed by popular expression, will aid much

in the clarification of the subject in the Senate itself, and will lead to convincing a majority of that body, and perhaps all, of the wisdom of the prompt ratification of the treaties as they were signed. I am especially anxious to emphasize the fact that I do not wish to be put in antagonism to the Senate. I am one of those who greatly admire the plan of government devised by our forefathers in the Constitution. I think that one of the most admirable features in that framework is the Senate of the United States, with its various functions. I should be the last, therefore, to seek to deprive the Senate of any of the powers given to it by the Constitution. If after full consideration and calm discussion the Senate shall take a different course from the one I urge, of course, like a law-abiding citizen, I shall cheerfully acquiesce in their judgment. But while this is my attitude, I do not think that it is improper for me, until the matter is settled, to urge ratification, to meet as best I can the arguments advanced against it, and respectfully to question a limitation upon the power of the Senate, which is made the basis for the contention that the Senate can not properly ratify and confirm these treaties. In other words, I am contending for larger powers in the making of these treaties on the part of the Senate than some Members of the Senate and of the Committee on Foreign Relations are willing to admit.

The first clause of the treaties binds the parties to submit either to The Hague or some other court of arbitration "all justiciable differences hereafter arising" between them, and provides that the submission of the question, when it arises, shall be by special agreement of the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and by England or France in accordance with their constitutional provisions. The second article provides for the organization of a joint high commission, to consist of three of the subjects or citizens of one of the countries and three of the other. At the request of either party any controversy between them may be referred to this commission for investigation and recommendation before it has been submitted to arbitration. The reference may be postponed until one year after the formal request has been made, in order to afford an opportunity for diplomatic discussion and adjustment of the questions. The report

of the joint high commission is to be advisory and not conclusive on either party in respect of all the questions that they pass upon, except one. That is where there is a difference between the parties as to whether the question at issue is subject to arbitration under the first clause or not. If so, and five out of six members of the commission decide that it is justiciable and so arbitrable under the first clause, then both parties are bound by that decision.

I have thus stated the nub of the treaties. They have been signed, and nothing awaits their going into force except the ratification of the Senate. I do not contend that if we make treaties war is to disappear. I do not contend that war will be absolutely impossible between the countries that make the treaties, because treaties have been violated, and you can not always foresee what a country in convulsions of fury may do; but I do contend that such treaties as these make war much less probable between the countries, and that as an example to other countries they suggest the wisdom of similar treaties, and thus furnish hope of general progress toward a condition in which war is generally less probable.

The evil of war and what follows in its train I need not dwell upon. The slightest acquaintance with history makes that known. We could not have a higher object than the adoption of any proper means which lessens the chance of war.

Those who have objected to the treaty have first suggested that the organization of the joint high commission, with the power given to either party to secure a reference of a controversy to it, for consideration for a year, makes it a breeder of war. I confess myself unable to follow the force of such an argument. Delay always cools the blood of individuals and nations. Discussion somewhat drawn out postpones the probability of violence and force. The level headed on both sides find in postponement of an issue and a crisis the best instrument for reducing the heat of a quarrel or the resentment at a fancied insult. Nothing so subdues the truculent spirit as the strain of long waiting to give it ratification.

But the main and chief objection, if I understand it, to the treaty is that the Senate can not agree to abide the judgment of a joint high commission like this as to whether a difference be-

tween the two countries comes under the description contained in the first clause, and is, therefore, arbitrable. By doing so, it is said the Senate will in some way part with the power conferred upon it by the Constitution, and which it is forbidden to delegate. It is clear that the Senate may agree to arbitrate a class of questions in advance of their arising in the future. At least, the present Senate can hardly dispute this, for it has already made many treaties in which it has agreed to arbitrate all questions except certain classes which are specified. If it has the right to agree to arbitration in the future upon any class of questions, and be bound by such an agreement, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that it may be bound to arbitrate the question of the construction of a treaty in the future, for such a question is one of the most frequent in actual practice that arises in international controversies. Now the issue whether a question arising is within the class described in the first section of the treaty is a question arising in the construction of the treaty. In what respect, therefore, is the power of the Senate limited to make an agreement on this subject?

Of course the question of power is one thing and the wisdom of exercising it is another. If the Senate thinks it unwise to consent to submit such a thing to arbitration, then the argument is upon the wisdom. Why is it unwise? Here are three men selected from one country and three from another to constitute this commission. They devote themselves to the investigation of the question. Is it likely that two out of three Americans or two out of three Englishmen or two out of three Frenchmen will consent that a question is arbitrable as against its own country if in fact it is not clearly so? How much real risk, therefore, is run by the Senate in consenting that five-sixths of the commission may decide a question of construction of the treaty? The importance of retaining the provision is, however, to give a pledge and sanction of the good faith of both parties in entering into the treaty and the real hope that it may avoid war. It is a self-denying arrangement. It assumes that the countries may be anxious to avoid arbitration, or that one of them may be, and it leaves this question to another tribunal than the country itself, to another judge than one of the parties, to de-

cide. If this is not done, and it is left to the parties to decide whether any issue comes under the first clause, the treaty is not very binding, because a strong motive present in the mind of either party to avoid arbitration of the particular issue will prompt every plausible objection by it that the matter is not arbitrable, and thus will prove fatal to the operation of the treaty upon the question. In other words, the treaty would become, in effect, then, only a general statement in favor of arbitration as a means of settling difficulties without effective obligation.

We wish to make progress—real progress—we wish to enter into a contract that binds us to something. We can not expect to win all our arbitrations; we can not expect to have an arbitration when we would and reject it when we would not, just because we think we might lose. If the arbitration method is to become useful at all, it must involve obligations by both parties to submit questions when they would rather not submit them. To make a contract under which we are able to do as we like in the future is to make no contract at all. It is a mere declaration of present willingness, with such a reservation as would enable us to follow our future desires as we will. It is this submission to another tribunal of the definite question whether the first clause includes the issue which has arisen and the agreement to abide the judgment that gives substance and weight to the treaty.

Norway and Sweden have entered into an agreement to arbitrate certain questions, with certain exceptions, and they have agreed that the Board of Arbitration may decide conclusively for the parties whether the question arising comes within the exceptions or the general rule contained in the treaty itself. I would be willing to go that far, and to leave to the Board of Arbitration itself the question whether the issue arising is within the first clause of the treaty. We find its complete analogy in the power of domestic courts to determine whether the question brought before it is within its own jurisdiction.

Here, lest there might be sensitiveness in giving to the arbitrators this full power to determine their own jurisdiction, another tribunal, consisting only of persons selected from the countries involved, was created to determine the question, and

a vote of five out of six was required before the decision should be binding. It is a concession to the spirit of the objection made in the Senate to the third clause—the spirit that hesitates to make a real agreement to arbitrate anything in the future lest in some way we may lose a controversy. I am bound to admit that submission to a commission constituted as this one is not the greatest step that could be taken, but it is a step in the right direction, toward a settlement of questions under a contract that has some binding force and sanction, and does not depend for its usefulness entirely upon the concurring willingness in the future of parties to abide by their own agreement.

These treaties, if ratified, will do much toward establishing arbitration as the means of settling all international difficulties. It would be a great misfortune if we were not able to avail ourselves of the opportunity which offers. I do not doubt we shall be able to negotiate with many other countries similar treaties, if these are confirmed by the Senate.

Objection has been made to the agreement of this treaty that under the first section it might be claimed that we would be called upon to submit to arbitration the Monroe doctrine, our right to exclude foreign peoples from our shores, or the question of the validity of the southern bonds issued in reconstruction days. These suggestions have nothing in them. The question of the Monroe policy is not a justiciable one. It is one of purely governmental policy which we have followed for a century, and which the countries of Europe have generally acquiesced in. With respect to this very matter, Sir Edward Grey, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, has announced publicly that the Monroe policy could not be disputed by them under this treaty, and would not come within its terms.

With respect to the exclusion of immigrants, it is a principle of international law that each country may admit of the persons who come to its shores those whom it chooses to have admitted and may reject the others. This is a subject of domestic policy which no foreign country can interfere in, unless provisions in a treaty affect the question, and then it may become properly a question of treaty construction and obligation. In the absence of a treaty, it is not an arbitrable question.

With reference to the right to involve the United States in a controversy over the obligation of certain Southern States to pay bonds issued during reconstruction, which have been repudiated, it is sufficient to say that such a question would not come within the treaty, for the treaty only affects "cases hereafter arising," and the cases of the southern bonds all arose years ago. These instances are cited to show the lack of wisdom in entering into the treaty. I refer to them to show that we would not be embarrassed in the slightest in respect to them by this treaty, because by its terms they are excluded from the scope of the arbitration it provides.


I think I have considered all the objections that are seriously made. I have treated them in a summary manner, but I hope my treatment of them is sufficient to set your minds working on the issue which is now pending with respect to the treaty, and that you may be convinced that the objections are not well taken and that the treaty ought to be ratified.

To the men who have known to their cost the horrors and sacrifices of war, to the men to whom the country is under a debt of the deepest gratitude for saving the Union—the men who were victors in war and yet were the first to make possible the union of hearts between the blue and the gray—to the men whose greatest leader expressed the national yearning in his words, "Let us have peace," I appeal to promote the cause of peace by approving these treaties and urging their ratification.





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